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RECENT DECISIONS

CORPORATIONS-Standard of care for directors and officers-Pennsylvania
Business Corporation Law § 408-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has held that Section 408 imposes on the directors and officers of a business
corporation a degree of care significantly higher than that existing prior
to its enactment.
Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of America, 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634
(1966).
Plaintiff-appellants, stockholders of the Manganese Corporation of America (hereinafter referred to as Manganese), brought a derivative suit in
equity against Manganese and its officers and directors. After suit was
begun, Selheimer, a minority director of Manganese, was severed as a
party plaintiff and joined as a defendant. The plaintiffs alleged that mismanagement of Manganese by the defendants had resulted in a loss of
approximately $400,000 of the corporation's assets and contended that
the defendants were personally liable for the loss because their actions
violated the standard of care established in Section 408 of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law. Section 408 states:
Officers and directors shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary
relation to the corporation, and shall discharge the duties of
their respective positions in good faith and with that diligence,
care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise
under similar circumstances in their personal business affairs.'
The Chancellor in Common Pleas Court found for the plaintiffs and
ordered the defendants to reimburse the receiver of Manganese for the
loss. Defendants filed exceptions which were sustained by the court en
banc in a 2-1 decision and this appeal by plaintiffs followed. Defendant
Gillan appealed the dismissal of the original defendants' complaint against
the additional defendant, Selheimer.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in a 6-0 decision reversed and
remanded. The opinion, written by Justice Jones, is significant for its
interpretation of Section 408 of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation
Law.
Before proceeding to the holding, a review of the facts is desirable. In
1958 defendants Himfar and Kusner formed a corporation named Mangamex, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Mangamex) to produce manganese
oxide at a New Jersey plant. Originally Himfar and Kusner were the only
stockholders in Mangamex but defendants Pie and Gillan subsequently
acquired Mangamex stock. In January 1959 Himfar, Kusner, Pie, and
Gillan (through nominees) formed Manganese, a Pennsylvania corpo1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-408. Since the Selheimer decision this section has been
renumbered as tit. 15, § 1408 (1967).
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ration. Manganese's authorized capital structure consisted of 400,000
shares of Class A, $2 par, stock and 200,000 share of Class B, 20¢ par,
stock. Class A stockholders could elect three directors and Class B four
directors. Himfar, Kusner, Pie, and Gillan were designated as the first
directors in Manganese's articles of incorporation. At the first directors'
meeting these four approved a plan whereby Manganese would purchase
Mangamex's assets ($91,500) and assume its indebtedness ($10,000) in
exchange for all of Manganese's Class B stock and such a transfer subsequently occurred. Mangamex then distributed its Manganese B stock
to Himfar, Kusner, Pie, and Gillan, its four stockholders. Next Manganese
made a public offering of 200,000 of its Class A shares at $3 per share.
This offering, which netted Manganese $412,914.50, was not registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission because the Securities Act
of 1933 provided that an offering was exempted from the registration provisions of the Act if the entire issue was sold to the residents of one state
and if the corporation issuing the stock was doing business in that state.2
The offering prospectus stated that Manganese intended to operate a
Colwyn, Pa. plant where the substantial operating activities would be
located. Prior to the public offering of the Class A stock defendant
Selheimer had been elected a minority director of Manganese by those
holding Class A stock at that time. In March 1959 Manganese paid
$10,000 as a down payment on the Colwyn, Pa. plant site, final settlement
to occur before September 1, 1959. The supreme court found that the
directors and officers of Manganese knew that their New Jersey plant
could not be operated profitably but despite this knowledge they continued to spend such large sums on its operation that when the Colwyn
plant was purchased in August 1959 only $55,000 of the $412,000 realized
from the Class A stock offering remained. The court found that "this
amount was patently insufficient to establish the originally projected plant
in Colwyn." 4 After Manganese went into bankruptcy in October 1960,
the receiver salvaged only $30,000.
After reviewing these facts Justice Jones examines Section 408 and
states:
2. The Securities Act of 1933 registration provisions do not apply to:

Any security which is a part of an issue offered and sold only to persons
resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a
person resident and doing business within or, if a corporation, incorporated by
and doing business within, such State or Territory. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(a)(11)
(1963).
3. The pertinent portion of the prospectus appears in n. 24, at 583 of 423 Pa. 563, and
at 645 of 224 A.2d 634 (1966). The court took note of this "token" compliance with the
federal statute, supra note 2, one of many factors which militated against the defendant
appellees, see 423 Pa. at 583-84, 224 A.2d at 645-46.
4. 423 Pa. at 571, 224 A.2d at 639.
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This statute mandates a standard of care for directors much
more stringent and harsh than the standard enunciated by our
courts prior to the passage of the statute. Our case law prior
to the statute taught that the directors of corporations-whether
business, banking, or otherwise-were held simply to a standard
of ordinary care and diligence and that, absent fraud or gross
negligence amounting to fraud, such directors would not be personally liable for their actions. The standard prior to Section
408 might well be stated as that care, skill and diligence which
the ordinary prudent man would exercise in similar circumstances.5
In his discussion of Section 408 Justice Jones notes (1) that the critical
phrase "in their personal business affairs" was not contained in the Uniform Model Business Corporation Act 6 but was added at the suggestion
of a committee of the Pennsylvania Bar Association,7 (2) that prior to
enactment the supreme court had expressly rejected the Section 408 standard of care,8 (3) that the Section 408 standard represents the minority
view in the United States,9 and (4) that the Section 408 standard imposes
a "much higher"'" degree of care on the directors of business corporations
than imposed by statute or case law on the directors of banking corporations or on the directors of building and loan corporations. 2 Justice Jones
5. Id. at 573-74, 224 A.2d at 640-41. Justice Jones documents this statement with
several cases: Hunt v. Aufderheide, 330 Pa. 362, 199 At. 345 (1938) where the conduct
in question had occurred prior to 1933, the year Section 408 went into effect, Swentzel v.
Penn Bank, 147 Pa. 140, 23 Ati. 405 (1892), Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 10 Am. Rep. 684
(1872). See also the excellent discussion in B.
BUILDING & LOAN LAW, Vol. 1, § 402, p. 362 (1941).

SEGAL,

PENNSYLVANIA

BANKING

AND

6. 9 U.L.A., p. 186-87.
7. See B. SEGAL, supra note 5, Vol. 1, § 402, p. 362.
8. Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 147 Pa. 140, 150, 23 Atl. 405, 414 (1892).
9. For this proposition Justice Jones cities: Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891),
Stone v. Rottman 183 Mo. 552, 82 S.W. 76 (1904), Forest of Dean Coal Mining Co.,
10 Ch. Div. 450, 451 (1878).
10. 423 Pa. at 578, 224 A.2d at 643.
11. The Banking Code of 1965 provides: "Directors, trustees and officers of an
institution shall discharge the duties of their respective positions in good faith and with
that diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar
circumstances in like positions." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 1411 (1967). This language is
identical to that found in the prior banking code. This language appears to be a codification
of the case law standard, see note 5, supra, and accompanying text.
12. The Building and Loan Code of 1933, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1074-1 to 1074-1303
(since the Selheimer decision the Code has been renumbered as §§ 5001 to 6303 (1967))
has no provision relating to the standard of care of directors and officers, thus these men
are governed by the case law standard, note 5 supra and accompanying text. See the
discussion in B. SEGAL, PENNSYLVANIA BANKING AND BUILDING & LOAN LAW, Vol. 1, § 402,

p. 362 (1941).

[Vol. 5:519

DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

recognized that Section 408 "may well render unattractive positions as
directors of business corporations,"' 3 but that "regardless of our doubts
as to the wisdom of the rule"' 4 the supreme court was bound to follow the
dictates of the legislature, any change being the legislature's prerogative.
Justice Jones held that under either the Section 408 standard or under
the case law standard existing prior to its enactment the directors of a
business corporation would be personally liable when they "have been
imprudent, wasteful, careless, and negligent. . . ."" and such actions
have resulted in the insolvency of the corporation despite "the absence of
fraud, self-dealing, or proof of personal profit or wanton acts of omission
and commission. . . . ,16 on the part of the directors. Both the Chancellor
and the court en banc had found defendants' actions to be imprudent,
wasteful, careless, and negligent. However, the court en banc had interpreted the supreme court's opinion in Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co." to
require a showing of fraud, self-dealing or personal profit or wanton
omission or commission before personal liability could be imposed. In
Smith the supreme court said that director conduct not amounting to
fraud, self-dealing or personal profit or wanton omission or commission
could be ratified by a majority vote of the stockholders 8 and since the
plaintiff had failed to allege such conduct he was barred from proceeding
since stockholder ratification had occurred. In Selheimer the supreme
court decided that the court en banc was incorrect in concluding that the
case at bar was controlled by the Smith decision saying that "[a] study
of Smith completely negatives . . . [this] ...conclusion ...
Justice
Jones then states:
",9

The rule is well settled that "[c]ourts are reluctant to interfere
in the internal management of a corporation, since that.is a
matter for the discretion and judgment of the directors and
stockholders, unless a minority stockholder's rights are jeopardized or injured by fraud or waste of company assets, or an
over-reaching, actual or legal: [citing authorities]." . . . ,20
13.
14.
15.
16.

423 Pa. at 578, 224 A.2d at 643.

Id.
Id. at 580, 224 A.2d at 644.
Id.

17. 414 Pa. 325, 200 A.2d 398 (1964).
18. The court quoted with approval the following language from Lowman v.
Harvey R. Pierce Co., 276 Pa. 382, 386, 120 Atl. 404, 406 (1923), "the majority stockholder
may not, as against the corporation and minority stockholder, dissipate or waste its funds,
or fraudulently dispose of them in any way, either by ratifying the action of the board of
directors in voting themselves illegal salaries, or by any other [similar] act." Smith v.
Brown-Borhek Co., 414 Pa. 325, 331, 200 A.2d 398, 400 (1964).
19. 423 Pa. at 580, 224 A.2d at 644.
20. Id. at 581, 224 A.2d at 644.
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After reviewing the record in light of this rule Justice Jones concludes,
"This record indicates clearly that the defendants, as the controlling
directors and officers, wasted and dissipated Manganese's assets. Their
actions constituted negligence such as was inimical to the corporation
and the other stockholders of the corporation."'" and thus they were
personally liable under either the Section 408 standard or under the case
law standard that existed prior to its enactment.
The court also found that the additional defendant Selheimer should
not be held liable because the record supported his contention that he had
protested the defendant's conduct and'-had converted his protests into
actions against the defendants.
The court remanded the case because it felt that the Chancellor had
erred in concluding that all of Manganese's losses were due to defendant's
conduct. The court concluded that "the nexus between Manganese's losses
and defendents' negligent and wasteful actions must act as the basis for
reimbursement. To establish such relationship the matter must be
remanded.

,,22

The case law standard ("that care, skill and diligence which the ordinary prudent man would exercise in similar, circumstances ' 23 ) required
only that a director emulate the ordinary prudent director. Thus, this
standard was fixed by whateyer the current practices of directors were.
If the ordinary prudent director was willing to take substantial risks, this
behavior set the case law standard despite the fact that in his personal
business affairs the director never would have assumed such risks. Under
the Section 408 standard ("that diligence, care and skill which ordinarily
prudent men would exercise. under similar circumstances in their personal
business affairs") 24 the director can no longer justify his actions by looking
to the conduct of other directors. Under Section 408 his conduct as a
director will be measured by his performance in his personal business
under similar circumstances. The phrase "under similar circumstances"
encompasses both (1) the fact situation presented to the director and
(2) the limitations of the director position, e.g., time. Thus, while the
Section 408 standard is obviously more stringent than that which existed
prior to its enactment, it does not require a director to be excessively
diligent. It is submitted that the investing public is entitled to the protection of a Section 408 standard.
John R. Kenrick
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 585, 224 A.2d at 646.
Id. at 586, 224 A.2d at 647.
See note 5 supra, and accompanying text.
See note 1 supra, and accompanying text.

